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Birmingham: On the Waterfront: Dissecting the Scope of ERISA Section 510

ON THE WATERFRONT:
DISSECTING THE SCOPE OF ERISA SECTION 510
Max Birmingham*
INTRODUCTION

This article addresses whether the anti-retaliation provision of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (hereinafter "ERISA"), 1 29
U.S.C. § 1140 [Section 510], permits an employer to discharge an
employee for making unsolicited internal complaints regarding violations
of the statute.
ERISA Section 510 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge ... a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of an employee benefit plan, [or] this subchapter ... or for
the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan, [or] this subchapter ...
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this
chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this
chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. In the case of
a multiemployer plan, it shall be unlawful for the plan sponsor or any
other person to discriminate against any contributing employer for
exercising rights under this chapter or for giving information or

*B.S., State University of New York at Empire State College; M.B.A., Northeastern University
D'Amore-McKim School of Business; J.D./M.J., Michigan State University College of Law. The
Author would like to thank Maria Filipakis; Justine Regina Kraus; Kate Juvinall, Orrick, Herrington
& Sutcliffe LLP; and last but certainly not least, the editors, staff, & faculty advisors of the Hofstra
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1.

§ 1001(b)

See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
(2018).

§ 302,

29 U.S.C.
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testifying in an inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter before
Congress. The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable
in the enforcement of this section.2

The federal circuits have split as to the interpretation of Section 510,
specifically given information or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to [ERISA]."3 The circuits that have
4
narrowly construed the statute employ a textualist approach.
"Textualism posits that courts are bound by a statute's plain meaning, and
that consideration of legislative history, spirit, or purpose is inappropriate
5
The circuits that have
in attempting to discern statutory meaning."
broadly construed the statute employ focus on the "give information"
language of Section 510. Moreover, said circuits have also pointed to
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., where the U.S.
6
Supreme Court held that "filed" should be broadly construed.
This article asserts that Section 510 does not protects an employee's
unsolicited internal complaints to management, and therefore permits an
employer to discharge an employee for making unsolicited internal
complaints regarding violations of the statute. Courts that have employed
a broad interpretation of Section 510 have done so by selectively choosing
7
language from the statute, rather than interpreting the statute as a whole.
Forbye, said courts have not asserted a canon of construction for which
8
they are basing their interpretation. Rather, they consistently state some
variation of "employee made an unsolicited internal complaint, and
thereby was 'giving information' as per what is proscribed by the
10
statute." 9 This violates statutory interpretation:
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
3. See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 333 (6th Cir. 2014). Judge White
dissented, explaining the circuit split:
The question whether section 510 protects unsolicited employee complaints has split the
circuits. The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have interpreted § 510 to protect an
employee's "unsolicited internal complaint." In contrast, the Second, Third, and Fourth

Circuits have interpreted

§ 510

as only protecting employees when the employer asks the

first question/initiates the inquiry.

See id. at 342.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction,108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1886 (2008).
6. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11, 14 (2011).
7. See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005).
8.

See Max Birmingham, Whistle While You Work: Interpreting Retaliation Remedies

Available to Whistleblowersin the Dodd-FrankAct, 13 FLA. A & M U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2017) ("Courts
engage in judicial activism when they interpret laws without regards to a canon of construction.").
9. See infra Part I.B.

10. See Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 59 (1871) (stating example of how statutes should be
interpreted).
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The true rulefor the construction of statutes is to look at the whole and
every part of the statute, and the apparent intention derived from the
whole, to the subject matter, to the effects and consequences, and to the
reason and spirit of the law; and thus to ascertain the true meaning of
the legislature, though the meaning so ascertained may sometimes
conflict with the literal sense of the words.II

"When courts rely on non-textualism, interpretations are much more
susceptible to manipulation as courts are enabled to foist their own
subjective views on the law."12
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes case law and how
the federal circuits have interpreted the statute. 13 Part II explores the
misconception that several courts have promulgated, which is that Section
510 is a remedial statute, and therefore in order to bring forth a claim
under the statute there needs to be standing under ERISA Section 502.14
Part III identifies public policy purposes as a reason for why courts should
construe the statute narrowly. 15 Part IV analogizes interpretations of other
whistleblower statutes to demonstrate why Section 510 should be
narrowly interpreted.16 Part V identifies that a broad interpretation of
Section 510 would lead to reductio ab adsurdum.1 7
I.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

A.

Courts Which Narrowly Interpret Section 510 of ERISA
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

In Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., the Second Circuit held that an
employee who made an unsolicited internal complaint to management is
not a formal proceeding, and is therefore not a protected activity.18
However, the court narrowed its decision with contradictory and
inconsistent syllogism.
The court stated that "[t]he meeting with
Koenigsberg was something less than a formal proceeding, but we believe
it was sufficient to constitute an "inquiry" within the meaning of Section

11. Id. (emphasis added).
12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See

Birmingham, supra note 8, at 42.
infra Part l.
infra Part II.
infra Part III.

16. See infra Part IV.
17.

See

infra Part V.

18. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005).
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510."19 The court then explained that "the proper focus is not on the
formality or informality of the circumstances under which an individual
gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances can fairly be
deemed to constitute an 'inquiry."' 20 If the meeting at issue is sufficient
to constitute an "inquiry," as the court alleged, then it should have ruled
in favor of Nicolaou. 2 1 Furthermore, the court does not explain why
formality or informality of the circumstances does not factor into its
analysis even though it is looking at "circumstances." 22 The court did not
23
elaborate on what circumstances it was scrutinizing.
In July 1998, Chrystina Nicolaou was hired at Horizon Media, Inc.
(hereinafter "Horizon") as its Director of Human Resources and
Administration. 24 One of her responsibilities was to serve as a fiduciary
trustee of Horizon's 401(k) employee benefits plan. 25 Soon after her
tenure began, Nicolaou "discovered a serious payroll discrepancy
involving underpayment of overtime to all non-exempt employees of the
[New York City] and Los Angeles offices." 26 Nicolaou notified Jerry
Riley, the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of Horizon, about this
28
Then, on two
matter. 27 Riley advised Nicolaou to drop the matter.
separate occasions Nicolaou contacted Stewart Linder, the Controller of
Horizon, regarding this matter. 29 Both times Linder declined to address
the matter. 3 0 Nicolaou next turned to Mark Silverman, an attorney for
Horizon. 3 1 Silverman looked into the matter and confirmed that there was
a payroll discrepancy. 32 Nicolaou and Silverman proceeded to meet with

19.

Id at 330.

20. Id. The court then explained its view of what constitutes an inquiry:
In any event, as we have explained, the proper focus is not on the formality or informality
of the circumstances under which an individual gives information, but rather on whether
the circumstances can fairly be deemed to constitute an "inquiry." Nicolaou's meeting

with Koenigsberg regarding possible violations of ERISA-a meeting that was initiated
at Silverman's behest-falls within the definition of an "inquiry" and, therefore, the

protection of Section 510.
See id
21. Id at 329.
22. Id. at 330.
23. Id.
24. Id at 326.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id.
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William Koenigsberg, the President of Horizon. 33 According to Nicolaou,
Koenigsberg was vexed that this issue was being brought to his
attention. 34 Shortly thereafter, Koenigsberg announced that a new human
resources professional would be brought onboard to take over for
Nicolaou because she was demoted to "Office Manager." 35 Horizon hired
two individuals to take over Nicolaou's former responsibilities. 36
Subsequently, Horizon terminated Nicolaou's employment in November
2000.37 Nicolaou filed suit alleging that alleging that the termination
violated the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA as well as Sections 15 and
16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA"). 38
The Nicolaou court did not properly interpret the statute. The
antiretaliation provision of ERISA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee who has "given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to
[ERISA.]" 39 Black's Law Dictionary defines inquiry as "[a] request for
information." 4 0 Black's Law Dictionary defines proceeding as:
1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts
and evens between the time of commencement and the entry of
judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal
or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. 4. The
business conducted by a court of other official body; a hearing 5.
Bankruptcy. A particular dispute or matter arising within a case - as
41
opposed to the case as a whole.

While the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion as the Fourth
Circuit, it disagreed with the Fourth Circuit in its basis for the decision. 42
The Second Circuit states that "We note that the amended complaint does
not specfy by whom this meeting was arranged."43 It is clearly alleged,
however, that in addition to informing him of the existence of the payroll
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
See id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).

40.

See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329; see also Inquiry, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.

2019).
41.

See Proceeding, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Nicolaou, 402 F.3d

at 329.
42. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (citing King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
43. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
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discrepancy, Silverman urged Koenigsberg to see that the problem would
be promptly rectified."44 The Second Circuit's analysis is spurious, as it
opined that Nicolaou would be protected under Section 510 if it could be
demonstrated that Koenigsberg contacted her about the plan's
underfunding. 45 In a contradiction, the court proclaims that "[t]he
meeting with Koenigsberg was something less than a formal proceeding,
but we believe it was sufficient to constitute an 'inquiry' within the
meaning of Section 510."46 The court is completely ignoring the language
of the statute, 4 7 and fixated on the definition of inquiry by an unqualified
interpretation of "request."48 The whole-text canon holds that "[t]he text
must be construed as a whole." 49 The relevant part of Section 510 states
an employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee who
has "given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry
or proceeding relating to [ERISA]." 5 0 Here, the court is completely
ignoring the "has testified or is about to testify" part in its analysis.5 1
Nicolaou is giving information to Koenigsberg in a meeting, and not in a
situation where she has testified or was about to testify. 52 Thus, under
these facts, even if Koenigsberg contacted Nicolaou about the plan's
underfunding, it would be still be a protected activity.5 3
In a concurring opinion, Judge Pooler offered reasoning that is a legal
argument insomuch as she is making an argumentum ad consequentiam
(argument to the consequences). 54 Judge Pooler argues that if a fiduciary
uncovers possible breaches of ERISA, a narrow interpretation of Section
510 would result in one of the following options, and proclaims that
"[t]his is surely a result to be avoided." 55 Judge Pooler states a fiduciary's
options as:

44. Id.
45.

See id. at 330 ("Certainly, if Nicolaou can demonstrate that she was contacted to meet with

Koenigsberg in order to give information about the alleged underfunding of the Plan, her actions
would fall within the protection of Section 510.").
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
48. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329 (displaying the court's view of the relationship between a
request and an inquiry).
49. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

TEXTS 167 (2012).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
51. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329 (displaying the court's analysis regarding Section 510).
52. Id. at 329-30.
53. See id. at 329 (detailing the broad range of situations the court believes to be covered under
Section 510).
54. See id. at 330-32 (Pooler, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 332 (Pooler, J., concurring).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol38/iss2/5

6

Birmingham: On the Waterfront: Dissecting the Scope of ERISA Section 510
319

ON THE WATERFRONT

2021]

(1) do nothing and face possible co-fiduciary liability under ERISA
Section 405; (2) make her own inquiries among her superiors and face a
retaliatory response; (3) bring the matter to the attention of a regulatory
agency and hope that doing so is not discovered by her superiors, at least
until the agency begins its own inquiry; or (4) take upon herself the
burden, and the uncertain prospects, of filing a suit under the provision
of ERISA which allows fiduciaries to seek "to enjoin any act or practice
that violates" the statute.5 6

With regard to the first option, it is misleading. A fiduciary could
file a complaint, and would be afforded protection under FLSA Section
15(a)(3). 57 Furthermore, Judge Pooler does not specify under what
theory, let alone duty, a plaintiff would have standing under to bring forth
against a defendant in Nicolaou's position. 58 To reiterate, Judge Pooler is
using the threatening tone of lawsuit liability to reinforce her message,
rather than frame her reasoning in legal analysis. 59
With regard to the second option, it is subject to circulus in
demonstrando60 (circular reasoning). Judge Pooler admits that if the
fiduciary makes their own inquiries (i.e. "unsolicited"), then they would
be outside the scope of Section 510.61 Nevertheless, Judge Pooler is
argues that a fiduciary, acting outside the scope of 510, should be afforded
the protections of Section 510.62 Moreover, this example is overstated as
it pertains to the case before the court. 63 Nicolaou did not face a
retaliatory response for making her own inquiries. 64 Nicolaou was told to
65
drop the matter by Linder, the Controller, on two separate occasions.
56.
57.

Id. at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring).
See Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.

§ 215(a)

(2012); see also Christopher

Theodorou, A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the Cheeks Decision on FLSA

Settlements, 35 HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 209, 213-16 (2017) (providing a brief overview of the
FLSA).
58. See generally Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (concurring opinion not indicating what theory a
plaintiff could establish standing or duty).
59. See id. at 331-32 (Pooler, J., concurring).
60.

See DOUGLAS N. WALTON, PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT IN EVERYDAY CONVERSATION 206

(1992) ("Wellington is in New Zealand. Therefore, Wellington is in New Zealand.").
61. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring) (discussing option two where a
fiduciary would "make her own inquiries among her superiors and face a retaliatory response").

62. See id. at 330 (Pooler, J., concurring) (focusing analysis on Nicolaou's fiduciary status).
63. See id. at 332 (Pooler, J., concurring) (asserting that if fiduciaries do not receive such
protection during initial stages of an investigation from retaliation, they may be hesitant to fulfill their
duties and functions); but see id. at 326 (describing how Nicolaou was only advised to let the matter

drop without any retaliatory action for her inquiries).
64. See id. at 330 (concluding that the retaliation complaint, without supplemental information
from the oral arguments made on appeal about a subsequent meeting's purpose and role in the

termination, is ambiguous).
65. Id. at 326.
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Nevertheless, she persisted on pursuing the matter. 66 Perhaps Horizon
Media thought that Nicolaou was being insubordinate, disobedient, could
not respect chain-of-command, or was not a cultural fit because she defied
Linder. 67
With regard to the third option, this would place said fiduciary within
the scope of Section 510.68 If said fiduciary brings the matter to the
attention of a regulatory agency, they would likely, at some point, give
information in an inquiry before the regulatory agency would decide as to
whether it should proceed with a lawsuit. 69 Notwithstanding, the
proscribed activity of 'giving information in an inquiry' would be met,
and said fiduciary would be afforded protection under Section 510.70
Also, this is a very unusual option as the Ninth Circuit observed that an
employee would normally notify management before contacting an
outside agency. 7 1
With regard to the fourth option, this would place said fiduciary
within the scope of Section 510.72 If said fiduciary files a suit, then they
will testify or be about to testify in a proceeding regarding ERISA. 73
Noticeably, Judge Pooler does not provide a canon of construction
for a broader view of the statute. 74 Judge Pooler argued that since
Nicolaou was a fiduciary, she should have been afforded protection from
the moment she began her investigation into the funding situation, and not
because she had a meeting with Koenigsberg. 75 This protection greatly
exceeds the interpretation of courts that have broadly interpreted Section

66.

See id.

67.

See generally id at 326 (discussing the various steps Nicolaou took after being told to drop

the matter).
68.

the third
69.
70.
71.

See id at 331 (bringing the matter to the attention of a regulatory agency as discussed in

option would most likely lead to an inquiry by the agency).
See id. (stating that at some point the regulatory agency would likely bring its own inquiry).
See id. at 328-29.
See Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). Stating that:

The normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way that might tempt an
employer to discharge one would be to present the problem first to the responsible

managers of the ERISA plan. If one is then discharged for raising the problem, the process
of giving information or testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory discharge
discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.

See

id.

72. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring) (stating that the fourth option means
filing a suit under the provision of ERISA to enjoin a violation of the statute).
73. See id. at 327, 329.
74. See Birmingham, supra note 8, at 1 ("Courts engage in judicial activism when they interpret
laws without regards to a canon of construction.").

75.

See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 332 (Pooler, J., concurring).
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510.76 The moment Nicolaou investigated the funding situation, she had
not yet "given information" to anybody. 77 Judge Pooler is trying to
legislate from the bench. If Section 510 should be worded in broader
terms, that is an issue for Congress. 78
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
In Edwards v. A.H Cornell & Son, Inc., the Third Circuit correctly
held that unsolicited internal complaints are outside of the scope of
Section 510 protection. 79 Plaintiff Shirley Edwards was employed in the
capacity of Director of Human Resources at A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.
("A.H. Cornell"). 80 Edwards filed suit alleging that A.H. Cornell
terminated her after she made complaints to management about ERISA
violations. 8 1 Specifically, Edwards found out that A.H. Cornell was
"administering the group health plan on a discriminatory basis,
misrepresenting to ... employees the cost of group health coverage in an
effort to dissuade employees from opting into benefits, and enrolling noncitizens in its ERISA plans .... " 82 The Federal District Court relied on
the Second Circuit's decision in Nicolaou, and dismissed Edwards's suit
because no one requested information from Edwards, and therefore she
was not involved in an "inquiry or proceeding" when she was
terminated. 83 The Third Circuit affirmed the Federal District Court's
decision. 84
The Third Circuit examined the language of the statute, 85 and
blazoning that the Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit failed to "examine[] the
statutory language of Section 510 in detail." 86 The court held that the plain

76. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1313-14 (5th Cir. 1994) (contrasting Fifth
Circuit case which interprets Section 510 broadly by asserting a federal cause of action where the

plaintiff did not plead one).
77. See id at 327, 329 (displaying Nicolaou's actions taken did not equate to an investigation
under the statute).

78. See id at 329 (holding that Congress intended the language to be interpreted with its plain
meaning and that no language was superfluous regarding the scope of protection).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 219.
See id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 222-24 (Section "C. The Plain Meaning of Section 510").
Id. at 223 ("Finally, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that the Ninth and Fifth Circuit

opinions in Hashimoto and Anderson, respectively, are not compelling. Neither court examined the
statutory language of Section 510 in detail: the Fifth Circuit gave the issue cursory
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language of Section 510 is unambiguous.8 7 In accordance with the
Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit interpreted
"proceeding" as part of a formal proceeding. 88 While acknowledging that
Edwards has 'given information,' the court's analysis turns on whether
this has taken place within the context of an 'inquiry or proceeding.' 89
The Edwards court then looked to the definition of "inquiry" and
ruled that since Plaintiff made unsolicited internal complaints, her 'given
information' was not in the context of an 'inquiry' and therefore
unprotected by Section 510.90 The court then noted that Section 510
states, in part, "employees that have 'given information' and not
employees who 'received information."' 9 1 Thus, the statute only refers to
"inquiries made of an employee, not inquires made by an employee." 92
Here, Edwards was not "receiving
This explanation is faulty.
information." 93 Rather, she was "giving information" as she made the
complaint, and A.H. Cornell was "receiving" the information. 94
Furthermore, the court should have focused on the definition of
"information." 95 Black's Law Dictionary defines "information" as "[a]
formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury
indictment." 96 What Edwards did does not meet the criteria of "give
information" according to a plain meaning interpretation of Section 510.97
Interestingly, numerous Federal Appellate Courts focus on the definitions
of "inquiry" and "proceeding" but none examined the definition of
"information." 98
The court was unpersuaded by the argument that the complaints
made by Edwards, by their very nature, met the definition of "inquiry." 9 9
The court reasoned that the complaints were statements, and not questions
seeking answers. 100 In an amicus brief, the Secretary of Labor implored
treatment, see Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314, and the Ninth Circuit appeared to focus its analysis on the

adoption
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

of a "fair" interpretation, see Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. See also King, 337 F.3d at 428.").
Id. at 223-24; cf wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1999).
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
Id.
Id. at 223; see also Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005).
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 222.
Id. (stating that Section 510 of ERISA applies to "any person [who] has given

information.").

96. Information, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
97. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222-23.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 223.
100. Id.
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the court that "inquiry" should be broadly interpreted, and thus include
unsolicited internal complaints in its sweep. 10 1
The Secretary of Labor and Edwards further made a facially invalid
argument when stating that since Section 510 is a remedial statute, it
should be liberally construed. 102 It is a "false notion that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed." 103 The U.S. Supreme Court has declared
that broadly construing a remedial statute is the "last redoubt of losing
causes." 104 There is no basis in law to theorize that Congress means more
(or less) than it says in a statute, simply because the legislation might be
described as "remedial." 1 0 5 The Secretary of Labor and Edwards did not
identify what constitutes a remedial statute, and how Section 510 is
one. 106 Indeed, "there is not the slightest agreement on what ... the
phrase 'remedial statutes"' means. 10 7
The Edwards court also distinguished this matter from a previous
Third Circuit decision which proclaimed that "ERISA 'should be liberally
construed in favor of protecting the participants in employee benefit
plans."' 10 8 The liberal construction canon is flawed because it is
"indeterminate, as to both when it applies and what it achieves." 109 The
liberal construction canon purports that Congress intends statutes to
extend as far as possible in order to achieve a single objective.110
However, "no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." 111 The court
ruled that ERISA provisions should only be "liberally construed" if there
is ambiguous language.1 1 2
The liberal-construction canon is

101. Id. at 222-24.
102. Id. at 222-23 ("The Secretary of Labor argues, in its brief as amicus curiae, that '[b]roadly
but naturally construed, "any inquiry or proceeding" encompasses plan participants' complaints to

management or plan officials about wrongdoing, and the process by which that information is
considered, however informal.' (Secretary Br. at 16.) We disagree.");

cf

Rettig v. Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kross v. W. Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 124243 (7th Cir. 1983).
103. SCALIA & GARNER,supra note 49, at 364-66.
104. OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 135 (1995).
105.

Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.

REv. 581, 586 (1990).
106. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223-24.
107. See Scalia, supra note 105, at 583.
108. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (citing IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson,
Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir.1986)).
109. See Scalia, supra note 105, at 586.
110.

Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50

U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 808-09 (1983) (The liberal construction canon "goes wrong by being unrealistic
about legislative objectives.").
111. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam).
112. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224.
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unsupportable because it is "indeterminate, as to both when it applies and
what it achieves." 113 The Edwards court held that Section 510 is
14
unambiguous, therefore the statute should not be broadly interpreted.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Cowen opined that Section 510's language
is ambiguous, and the majority's interpretation is contrary to
Congressional intent.1 1 5 Judge Cowen goes on to pose a hypothetical
when he asks:
For instance, suppose an employee like Edwards complains to her
superior, the superior asks some follow-up questions, and the employee
responds to these questions. Are the informal responses to some
impromptu questions to be regarded as protected because they evidently
were made as part of an "inquiry?" In turn, why should such responses
be protected while, at the same time, an employer is essentially
permitted (and perhaps, in essence, encouraged) to fire an employee
immediately after she makes an informal complaint instead of
1 16
conducting an investigation of some sort?

The fatal flaw with Judge Cowen's hypothetical is that does not address
the majority's position on the definition of "inquiry." 11 7 Judge Cowen's
hypothetical is that it alleges that someone who makes an informal
complaint is a whistleblower.11 8 The majority noted that "[t]he fact that
Edwards's complaints may have eventually "culminat[ed]" in an inquiry
(see Secretary Br. at 17) underscores the fact that the complaints
themselves, without more, do not constitute an inquiry. "119 The majority
opinion alleges that "inquiry" is less formal than a proceeding, but it is
above the level of an informal complaint. 120 This may include "an
investigation of some sort." 12 1 Judge Cowen fails to explain why an
12 2
informal complaint rises to the level of "inquiry."
Judge Cowen does not point to any evidence to support his claim that
the majority's view is contrary to Congressional intent. 12 3 Rather, he is

113. See Scalia, supra note 105, at 586.
114. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223-24; cf Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 356 (3d
Cir. 1999); see POSNER, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
115. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 228.
117. Id. at 226-31.
118. Id. at 228.
119. Id. at 223.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 228 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 226.
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projecting his view of the statute onto what he alleges Congressional
intent is.124 With regard to legislative history, it should be used with
One jurist
extreme caution in determining Congressional intent.
analogized it as one going to a cocktail party and then looking for their
friends. 12 5 In addition, Judge Cowen does not analyze the statute and
propound any canons of construction to advance his interpretation. 126
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
In King v. MarriottInternational, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that
Section 510 only protects "formal" complaints.1 27 However, the
reasoning that the court outlined could be susceptible after the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain PerformancePlastics
Corp. 128

Plaintiff Karen King alleged that her termination was in retaliation
for making complaints about ERISA violations, as well as refusing to
commit ERISA violations.1 29 King worked in the benefits department of
Marriott International, Inc. ("Marriott") for many years, and was
considered to be an excellent employee.1 30 King claimed that in late 1998
or early 1999, Senior Vice President of Compensation and Benefits Karl
I. Fredericks implored her to "transfer millions of dollars from its medical
plan into its general corporate reserve account." 13 1 King expressed
reservations about executing this transaction.1 32 In late 1999, Fredericks
gave King a promotion, which included the responsibility of overseeing
benefit plan finances. 133 After King was promoted she discovered that
the transfer of funds from the medical plan into the general corporate
reserve account was once again under consideration.1 34 Upon discovering
this, King notified Fredericks as well as two in-house attorneys that she
objected to the transaction. 135 She also requested that one of the in-house

124.

Id.

125.

Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use of LegislativeHistory in the 1981 Supreme

Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
126. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
127. King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
128. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 563 U.S. 1 (2011).
129. King, 337 F.3d at 423.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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attorneys provide an opinion letter. 136 In September 1999, Fredericks
restructured the benefits department and gave King another promotion,
elevating her to Vice President of Benefit Resources. 137 King shared her
responsibilities with another employee. 138 King feuded with the other
employee with whom she shared responsibilities. 139 The feud was
significant enough that it caused several employees in the benefits
department to seek transfers. 140 In early 2000, Marriott again considered
the transferring funds from the medical plan into the general corporate
reserve account. 14 1 King objected again, both verbally and in writing this
time, to Fredericks. 142 Shortly thereafter, King was fired. 143 Fredericks
claimed that King was terminated over the feud. 144
King initially filed her complaint in state court, alleging that her
termination violated Maryland's public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. 145 Marriott removed the case to federal court by
arguing that Section 510 of ERISA preempted the state's wrongful
discharge claim. 146 The Federal District Court denied King's motion to
remand the case, and granted summary judgment to Marriott on all
claims. 14 7
The court should not have compared Section 510 with another
statute. 14 8 This is asseverated with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that
the term "filed" in the FLSA whistleblower statute should be interpreted
broadly. 149 The FLSA whistleblower statute states that an employer is
prohibited from terminating an employee who has "filed any complaint or
institutedor caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the
FLSA], or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding."1 50
In Kasten, the Court notes, "[t]he phrase central to the outcome here is

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423-24.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 563 U.S. 1, 1-2 (2011).
Id. at 9-14.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
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'filed any complaint."' 15 1 The Court ruled that "filed" includes oral and
written complaints. 15 2
Citing a previous case, Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., the Fourth
Circuit declared that the term "proceedings" under the FLSA
whistleblower statute means "procedures conducted in judicial or
administrative tribunals." 153 The court also held that "the term 'instituted'
connotes" a level of formality that is not reached by making an "oral
complaint to [a] supervisor."1 54 The opinion in Memphis Bar-B-Q Co.
concluded that the FLSA did not intend to protect employees who make
unsolicited internal complaints.1 55 The court relied upon this to surmise
that the phrase "inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]" in Section 510 means "legal
or administrative, or at least to something more formal than written or
oral complaints made to a supervisor."1 56 This is contradicted by
Kasten.1 57 While Kasten did not mention solicitation (solicited or
unsolicited), the Court ultimately ruled that the FLSA prohibits retaliation
against workers for complaining about violations of the Act even if the
complaint is oral rather than written.' 58 Under this reasoning, it is likely
the Court would hold that Section 510 includes unsolicited internal
complaints.1 59 However, there are caveats. First, Kasten was decided
narrowly, and if more Conservatives are appointed to the Court, it could
be overturned.1 60 Second, it could have compared Section 510 with a
whistleblower statute that is plain, such as the anti-retaliation provision of

151. Kasten, 563 U.S. at 18.
152. Id at 4 ("We must decide whether the statutory term 'filed any complaint' includes oral as
well as written complaints within its scope. We conclude that it does.").
153. Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
157. Kasten, 563 U.S. at 4.
158. Id. at 4, 17.
159. Id. at 17.
160. See generally Andrew Chung, Supreme Court'sBusiness-Friendly Reputation Takes a Hit,
REUTERS (June 26, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-business/supreme-courts-

business-friendly-reputation-takes-a-hit-idUSKCNlTR302 ("Overall, the court's rulings helped the
business community more than they hurt, a regular feature under conservative Chief Justice John
Roberts."); Adam Liptak, CorporationsFind a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-thissupreme-court.html; see also Theodorou, supra note 57, at 219 (discussing how the legislative process
of the FLSA indicates that is intended to be narrowly construed). "In the case of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1937, broad discretionary power had been placed in the hands of the Fair Labor
Standards Board in accordance with Landis' theory. 'As the bill progressed, the discretion became
more and more narrow and the specific exemptions became larger and larger."' Id.
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the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act. 1 6 1
The King court maintained that Section 510 and the FLSA provision
both include the phrase "testified or is about to testify." 162 The court
should have relied on this plain language rather than try to justify its
holding based upon an interpretation of a similar statute. "Testified or is
about to testify" clearly indicates a formal proceeding. 163
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of Section
510 is narrower than that of the interpretations of the statute by the Fifth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit. 164 It called the Fifth Circuit's decision
The court identified that there is a 'facial
"unpersuasive."165
inapplicabilityof section 510 to intra-office complaints." 166 The Fourth
Circuit declared that the Ninth Circuit's decision is grounded in the public
policy of protecting whistleblowers. 167 The court pointed out that the
Ninth Circuit lacked statutory interpretation in its opinion. 168 Observing
that Section 510 is plain, it cannot be "fairly construed" to cover
unsolicited internal complaints. 169
4. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
In Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 170 the Sixth Circuit accurately
held that unsolicited internal complaints are not protected by Section
510.171 The court descries that an unsolicited internal complaint, an email
in this case, does not rise to the level of "inquiry" which means either an
official investigation or a request for information. 172 Citing that other
federal statutes have language prohibiting retaliation against employees
who complain about or oppose unlawful practices, the court emphasizes
161.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (effective July 22, 2010). The U.S. Supreme Court held that this

statute is plain, and gave a 9-0 "pro-business" ruling. See Digital Realty Trust v. Somers, 138 S.Ct.

767, 770, 772-73, 778, 781-82 (2018).
162. King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. (citing Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 2000)).
164.

Id. at 428; see generally infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the holding in Anderson); see generally

supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the holding in Hashimoto).
165. King, 337 F.3d at 428.
166. Id.
167. Id. n.4.
168. Id. at 428.
169. Id.
170. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014).
171. Id. at 333-34 ("When Brian Sexton made a one-time unsolicited complaint to his employer
about alleged violations of the Act, did that amount to 'giv[ing] information ...
think not and hence affirm.").

in any inquiry?' We

172. Id. at 335.
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that said language is absent in Section 510 and evidences that Congress
did not intend for it to be extended as such. 173
In 2011, Brian Sexton (a general manager and trustee of Panel
Processing's employee retirement plan) and another employee, Robert
Karsten, campaigned for two employees to be on the board of directors. 174
The employees won the election, but the board refused to seat them,
claiming that it would violate company bylaws which limit the number of
insider directors.1 7 5 The board also removed Sexton and Karsten as
trustees of the retirement plan. 176 In response, Sexton sent the following
email to the chairman of the board:
I believe that your actions ... in refusing to seat [the employees] as
directors of the company and removing Rob Karsten and me as Trustees
of the [retirement plan] are violations of ERISA and the Michigan
Corporations Business Act and other state and federal laws. I plan to
bring these violations to the attention of the U.S. Department of Labor
and Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs unless
they are immediately remedied. 17 7

No one, including the chairman, replied to Sexton's email. 178 Despite
claiming that he would contact government agencies, Sexton did not take
any further action. 179 Approximately six months later, Panel Processing
fired Sexton. 180
Plaintiff made a tactical error, which the court touches upon in a
stealthy manner. 18 1 Sexton originally filed suit in state court, alleging
violation of the State's Whistleblower Protection Act and for breach of
his employment contract.18 2 Panel Processing removed the case to federal
court on the basis of the whistleblower claim being an ERISA claim. 183
"Once in federal court, Sexton did not challenge the company's removal
of the case or its use of complete preemption. Sexton and Panel Processing
instead litigated the case as though Sexton had raised a claim under

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at
Id at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

342.
334.

332-33.
334.
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ERISA." 184 Had Sexton argued his case in state court, perhaps the
185
decision may have turned out differently.
The Sixth Circuit provides incongruent reasoning when stating that
"we are satisfied, just as the parties and the district court were satisfied,
186
The court
that the company properly invoked the doctrine here."
187
did
Sexton
If
a
threat.
and
characterized Sexton's email as a complaint
two
not "give information," as the court discerns, and he clearly cited
different statutes ("violations of ERISA and the Michigan Corporations
Business Act"), then there is a strong argument that the preemption
188
In this instance, ERISA cannot
doctrine was not properly invoked.
preempt the Michigan Corporations Business Act and the Michigan
189
Corporations Business Act cannot preempt ERISA.
The court then elucidates that there are statutes which include two
types of clauses: "The first protects employees who oppose, report or
complain about unlawful practices 190 ; [t]he second protects employees
who participate, testify or give information in inquiries, investigations,
proceedings or hearings."191 While ERISA does not have the first type of
184. Id.
185. MICH COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (1980) ("An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or
otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf
of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation
of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this
state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or
because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or

inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.").
186. Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334 ("On appeal, Sexton does not contest the district court's application
of complete preemption to Sexton's claim or otherwise attempt to resurrect his claim under
Michigan's Whistleblower Protection Act. Under our case law, true enough, the doctrine of complete
preemption goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.").

187. Id. at 335 ("As the text of the email confirms, this was nothing more than a complaint
accompanied by a threat: Sexton demanded that the company change course and threatened action if

it did not. The email neither asks nor answers a question. That is not 'giv[ing] information ...
inquiry.').

in any

188. See generally id. at 334-36 (explaining that because Sexton did not give information and in
enacting that specific provision of ERISA, Congress only meant to protect people giving information
or testifying in inquiries, the preemption doctrine is not invoked since that only converts state law

claims falling within ERISA's scope into federal claims).
189. Id. at 340-41.
190. Id. at 335 ("See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 218c(a) (Consumer Financial Protection Act)
("provided ... information relating to any violation"); id. § 215(a) (Fair Labor Standards Act) ("filed
unlawful employment
any complaint"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VI) ("opposed any ...
practice").").

191. Id. ("See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 218c(a) (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) ("assisted
or participated . .. in ... a proceeding"); id. § 2615(b) (Family and Medical Leave Act) ("given ...
any information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding"); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (Americans
with Disabilities Act) ("participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing").
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clause, the Michigan Corporations Business Act does have the first type
of clause.1 92 Furthermore, the court explicates that Sexton did not
disclose violations of the law and that Section 510 does not protect
employees who complain about violations of the law. 193 The Michigan
Corporations Business Act states, in part, "employee, reports or is about
to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a
law or regulation or rule." 194 Sexton, an employee of Panel Processing at
the time, made a report in writing (the email), in which he identified a
suspected violation of laws (ERISA and the Michigan Corporations
Business Act). 195
The Sixth Circuit reluctantly seems to acknowledge that preemption
may not have been properly invoked, despite contradicting this by
explicitly stating the opposite. 196 The court admits "Sexton sued the
company in Michigan state court for violating the State's Whistleblower
Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. "One might
think that, when a Michigan plaintiff sues a Michigan defendant under
Michigan law in a Michigan court, the case would stay there."1 97
However, since Sexton did not object to the preemption argument made
by Panel Processing, the Sixth Circuit was correct in showing judicial
restraint. 198
B. Courts Which Broadly Interpret Section 510 of ERISA
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
In an absolutely stunning display of judicial activism, 199 the Fifth
Circuit asserted causes of action on behalf of the plaintiff in Anderson v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.200 Plaintiff George Anderson originally
brought forth suit in state court, where he alleged wrongful discharge
among other state common law claims, against Electronic Data Systems
192. Id. at 333; MICH COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (1980).
193. See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 338; see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217,
218 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that employees' complaints that are not part of an inquiry or proceeding
are not protected under Section 510).

194. MICH COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (1980).
195. See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Judicial Activism, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A philosophy of judicial
decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors,
to guide their decisions.").
200. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994).
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(hereinafter "EDS"). 2 01 EDS removed the case to Federal District Court,
where it was granted summary judgment because it was determined that
the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction on the wrongful
discharge claim. 202
The Fifth Circuit considered whether the federal court had subject
20 3
While
matter jurisdiction over the state law wrongful discharge claim.
the court acknowledged that ERISA preempts state law claims, it held that
preemption does not end the court's analysis because preemption is a
defense and "federal question jurisdiction is determined by the wellpleaded complaint rule." 204 This is richly ironic, as "Anderson filed an
amended complaint deleting all references to ERISA." 205 Nevertheless,
the Fifth Circuit centered its opinion on ERISA. 2 06 The Fifth Circuit
freely admitted that plaintiff Anderson never asserted a federal cause of
action.20 7 Anderson alleged that, on two separate occasions, a supervisor
beseeched him to approve or pay invoices using funds retained by another
208
employee without the approval of the pension fund's board of trustees.
Additionally, Anderson claimed that he was asked to write up minutes for
meetings regarding a retirement plan even though he was not in
attendance. 2 09 Anderson stated that he refused to comply, and as a result
EDS terminated him. 2 10 Since Anderson never asserted a whistleblower
cause of action, it is fair to say that he did not characterize himself as a
whistleblower despite the Fifth Circuit doing so. 2 11 Moreover, Anderson
did not allege that his termination was in "retaliation," which is what
Section 510 prohibits. 2 1 2 Rather, Anderson alleged that his termination
was "wrongful." 2 13 Anderson's state wrongful termination claim is
2 14
premised upon his refusal to commit a criminal act.

at 1312.
at 1313.
at 1315.
at 1314-15.
at 1313 (emphasis added).
at 1315.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

207.

Id. at 1313 ("The state court petition did not allege any federal causes of action.").

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1315.
See 29 U.S.C.§ 1140 (2018).

213. Wrongful, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("(2) Contrary to law; unlawful
<wrongful termination>.").

214.

See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313.
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Of significance, Anderson does not confirm whether the alleged
2 15
If
wrongful acts he was implored to commit were in fact committed.
no
concrete
is
there
these alleged wrongful acts never took place, then
injury to blow the whistle on. 216 Accordingly, Anderson's claim does not
"fall squarely within the ambit" of Section 510, despite the Fifth Circuit's
insistence that it does. 2 17 This is precisely why Anderson filed a wrong
termination lawsuit under a state common law claim rather than
ERISA. 218
In an attempt to cloak its judicial activism, the court offered no
statutory interpretation of Section 510.219 Statutory interpretation begins
with "the language itself, the specific context in which that language is
220
The court held
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."
221
an
that Section 502 enforces Section 510, which "broadly prohibits"
for
fiduciaries
or
beneficiaries,
participants,
terminating
employer from
giving information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to ERISA. 2 22 Section 502 provides a cause of action
for a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him, or if any act
223
Here, Anderson
or practice violates any provision of this subchapter.
2 24
Anderson
Further,
never argued that EDS denied benefits due to him.
did not claim that he "gave information" or "testified or was about to

215.

See generally id. (containing no confirmation by Anderson that his coworker actually

followed through with the acts).
216. Id. at 1315 (holding that all claims under ERISA must be linked to an actual breach by a
fiduciary).
217. Id. at 1314; see also Wrongful Discharge, TEX. wORKFORCE COMM'N., https://
("(2) common law exceptions (i.e.,
www.twc.state.tx.us/news/efte/wrongfuldischarge.htmil

exceptions found in court decisions) a. public policy: it is illegal to discharge an employee for refusing
to commit a criminal act") (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).

218. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1312.
219.

See Birmingham, supra note 8 and accompanying text.

220.
221.
222.
223.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315-16.
Id.
ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2018) (providing in relevant part: 'A civil action may

be brought - (1) by a participant or beneficiary- . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits

under the terms of the plan[.]'); ERISA 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(3)

(1982) (providing in relevant part 'A

civil action may be brought-. . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this

subchapter or the terms of the plan[.]').
224. See Anderson, 11 F. 3d 1311.
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testify." 225 Rather, Anderson states that he was wrongful terminated
because he refused to comply with unlawful acts. 226
Moreover, the court confesses that Anderson alleged other reasons
for his termination, such as violating laws and regulations enforced by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.22 7 Section 510 is limited to
ERISA. 228 Ergo, the Fifth Circuit's judicial activism fails on its face.
Anderson, according to his complaint, was terminated for reasons other
than ERISA whistleblowing. 229 Therefore, Anderson's termination is
outside the scope of Section 510.230
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has legislated from the bench with regard to
Section 510.231 In George v. JuniorAchievement of CentralIndiana,Inc.,
the court used a tortured definition of statutory interpretation to hold that
Section 510 does not permit an employer to discharge an employee for
making unsolicited internal complaints. 2 32 In George, plaintiff Victor
George alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for raising the issue
of discrepancies with regard to his ERISA plan. 233 In the summer of 2009,
Plaintiff George noticed that money was being withheld from his
paychecks and it was not being deposited into his retirement account and
health savings account. 234 Unsolicited, he complained to some of the
company's accountants and executives, including Jennifer Burk, the
President and CEO. 235 In October 2009, after contacting board members
about his grievance, this issue was remedied when he received checks to
make up for the missed deposit, including interest. 236
In January 2010, Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, Inc.
(hereinafter "Junior Achievement") noticed that George accessed funds in
his account which contained deferred compensation. 237 Burk believed
225. Id. at 1314 n.2.
226. Id. at 1313.
227. Id. at 1315 (holding that "the allegations of these other wrongful acts does not alter our
analysis").
228. Id. at 1314.
229. Id. at 1312-1313.
230. Id. at 1314.
231. George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2012).
232. Id. at 817.
233. Id. at 813-14.
234. Id. at 813.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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that George acted prematurely by drawing down on these funds. 238 To
boot, "George was contemplating retirement." 239 "His employment
agreement ran until June 30, 2010, but in late 2009 he had discussions
with Burk and others about retiring in April 2010."240 "On January 4,
2010, Burk told George not to come to work the next day." 24 1 An attorney
for Junior Achievement notified George that he was terminated effective
as of December 31, 2009, and demanded that George restore the funds in
his deferred compensation account. 242 Junior Achievement may have
thought that George was inappropriately drawing down on his deferred
compensation.243 With his previous discussions of retiring only a few
months away, it is plausible that Junior Achievement thought that is why
he was taking the funds out. 244 However, that is not a defense for George
prematurely withdrawing the funds. 245 Nevertheless, the aforementioned
would be a reason for terminating George that is outside the scope of
Section 510.246
The court completely overlooks the issue of statutory interpretation
of Section 510 when it observes that George did not file a written
complaint, although he did notify the United States Department of Labor
(hereinafter "DOL").247 The issue is whether the complaint is solicited or
unsolicited. Whether George filed a written complaint or not does not
impact the analysis of this case. If George had "given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding" to the United
States Department of Labor and then was terminated, he would have a
much stronger argument that his employer violated Section 510.248
"Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning rule, which says
that all other relevant information about statutory interpretation is not
considered when the statutory text is plain or unambiguous." 249 The
Seventh Circuit ignored the plain meaning rule by offering up a tortured
explanation that the language is ambiguous. 2 50 In a richly ironic
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id. at 813.
29 U.S.C.

249.

Max Birmingham, Up in the Air: Analyzing Whether the Clean Air Act Preempts State

§ 1140 (2018).

Common Law Claims, 14 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 55,83 (2019).
250. George, 694 F.3d at 814-15.
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statement, the court claimed the statute is ambiguous yet it also conceded
that it must "enforce the text as enacted, without the additions." 2 51 If the
court were to "enforce the text as enacted, without additions" then it would
have to enforce the statute under the plain meaning rule.25 2 Thus, if the
court were to "enforce the text as enacted, without additions" then the
statute would be unambiguous. If the statute is ambiguous, as the court
alleges, then it has to look at different interpretations and different canons
of construction. 253
The Seventh Circuit focuses on the word "in" which is a preposition
in the context of Section 510. According to the court, "Section 510 can
be parsed this way: 254 ((has given information) or (has testified or is about
to testify)) in (any ((inquiry) or (proceeding))). 255 Likewise we can group
the actions and settings based on formality: "((has given information) in
(any inquiry)) or ((has testified or is about to testify) in (any
proceeding))." 2 56 This parsing is puzzling, to say the least. The court
selectively chooses part of the statute to parse, and then compares it with
a different part. Moreover, the court does not cite any canons of
construction in its interpretation of the parsing. 257 Here are some canons
of construction applied to parsing the statute: "Series-Qualifier Canon: 25 8
(given information) or ((has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry
Under this canon of
or proceeding relating to [ERISA.])." 25 9
construction, "testified or is about to testify" qualifies "inquiry or
proceeding." As George did not testify or was about to testify, he is
outside the scope of Section 510. General/Specific Canon 260 ((given
information or has testified or is about to testify)) (in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to [ERISA.].). Under this canon of construction,
"testified or is about to testify" qualifies "given information" as it is more
specific. Black's Law Dictionary defines "testify" as "[t]o give evidences
as a witness <she testified that the Ford Bronco was at the defendant's
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 815.
Id.
See id. at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See SCALLA & GARNER, supra note 49, at 147 (explaining the Series-Qualifier Canon:

"[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a

prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.").
259. George, 694 F.3d at 814-15.
260. See SCALIA & GARNER, supranote 49, at 183 (arguing that "if there is a conflict between a
general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (generaliaspecialibusnon
derogant).").
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home at the critical time>." 2 61 Black's Law Dictionary does not define
"give information." Additionally, "give information" is a very specific
term.
The statute does not specifically state to whom the "give
information" applies to, or the setting in which it takes place. 262
The court also focused on the multiple definitions of "inquiry." The
court rejected the analogy of "inquiry" to "question." 263 The court held
that if "inquiry" is a synonym for "question," then the statute only affords
protection to questions "asked of the employee but not questions
asked by an employee." 264 Black's Law Dictionary defines "inquiry" as
"[a] request for information." 265 Black's Law Dictionary defines
"question" as "a query directed to a witness." 266 Black's Law Dictionary
defines "witness" as "[s]omeone who gives testimony under oath or
affirmation (1) in person, (2) by oral or written deposition, or (3) by
affidavit." 267 These definitions and the relevant part of Section 510"has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to
[ERISA]"-give rise to the argument that "question" is a suitable analogy
to "inquiry" in this context. Moreover, the aforementioned definitions
and the above part of Section 510 give rise to the argument that the statute
does not protect unsolicited internal complaints regarding ERISA, and
thereby permits an employer to discharge an employee for doing so. 268
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit used the Oxford English Dictionary, but
not Black's Law Dictionary. 2 69 Expounding on the definition of
"inquiry," Black's Law Dictionary defines "request" as "[t]o ask for
something or for permission or authority to do, see, hear, etc., something;
to solicit; and is synonymous with beg, entreat, and beseech. 2 70 The
definition employed by the court does not speak to whether the "inquiry"
was solicited or unsolicited. 27 1
The Seventh Circuit's opinion alleges to be grounded in statutory
interpretation, yet it offered no canon of construction. Moreover, it parsed
the statute but not did not adequately explain how it supports its finding

261.
262.
263.
264.
Edwards
265.
266.

Testify, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
George, 694 F.3d at 815.
See id. (this holding is in direct conflict with rejecting the Third Circuit's decision in
v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Inquiry, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Question, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

267. Witness, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
268. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010).
269. See George, 694 F.3d at 815.
270.

Request, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968).

271. See George, 694 F.3d at 815.
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that Section 510 should be broadly interpreted. 272 The argument that
"inquiry" is analogous to "question" is precisely the argument as to why
Section 510 permits an employer to discharge an employee for making
unsolicited internal complaints regarding violations of the statute.
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit'
Akin to the Fifth Circuit, 273 the Ninth Circuit engaged in judicial
activism 274 in its handling of determining whether Section 510 permits an
employer to discharge an employee for making unsolicited internal
complaints regarding violations of the statute. 275 The Ninth Circuit
employed its "takeover of the appeal" customary practice. 2 76
In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, Jessica Hashimoto originally filed
suit in state court, alleging that her termination was retaliation and in
violation of Hawaii Whistle Blowers' Protection Act.2 77 In her complaint,
Hashimoto alleged her employer terminated her for making unsolicited
internal complaints about ERISA violations. 278 In the first instance,
Hashimoto alleged that a supervisor directed her to reimburse a former
employee for taxes from a profit-sharing plan, even though the taxes were
properly withheld. 279 In the second instance, Hashimoto alleged that
another supervisor instructed her to recalculate a former employee's
pension plan benefit using final pay rather than final average pay.2 80 Bank
of Hawaii removed the case to Federal District Court, where it was granted
summary judgment because it was determined that Hashimoto's state law
claim was preempted by ERISA. 28 1

272.
273.
274.
275.

See id.
See supraPart I.B.1.
See JudicialActivism, supranote 202 and accompanying text.
Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Hawaii Whistle

Blowers' Protection Act). Section 378-62 states: "An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or
otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because: (1) [t]he employee, or a person acting on

behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in writing, a violation
or a suspected violation of (A) [a] law, rule, ordinance, or regulation, adopted pursuant to law of this
State, or the United States; or (B) [a] contract executed by the State, a political subdivision of this
State, or the United States, unless the employee knows that the report is false." HAW. REV. STAT.

§ 378-62.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1581 (2020).
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 410.
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The Ninth Circuit did not apply any canon of construction in its
analysis of Section 510. Moreover, the court's reasoning that offered an
explanation which is petitio principii (a circular argument sometimes
known as begging the question) 2 82 as to why Hashimoto is protected by
the statute. The court stated that "[t]his statute is clearly meant to protect
whistle blowers."2 83 "It may be fairly construed to protect a person in
Hashimoto's position if, in fact, she was fired because she was protesting
a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan." 2 84 Judge Aldisert
illustrated petitioprincipiiwith a dialogue between Socrates and Crito:
Soc.: Is there federal jurisdiction?

Cr.: Yes, there is federal jurisdiction.
Soc.:How is there federal jurisdiction?
Cr.: There is federal jurisdiction because factual impossibility of
performing a conspiracy is no defense to a charge of conspiracy which
285
may be brought when there is federal jurisdiction.

Here, the court's syllogism was that the statute protects whistleblowers,
and it protected Hashimoto because she was a whistleblower. The court
failed to examine the language of the statute. The court's analysis should
have first looked to the relevant part of the statute - "given information or
has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to
[ERISA]" 286-and
then articulated how it pertains to Hashimoto.
Furthermore, the court undercuts its argument as to why Hashimoto
should be afforded protection under Section 510. The court stated if
Section 510 is "clearly meant" to protect whistleblowers, then there
should be no need for it to be "fairly construed" to protect
whistleblowers. 2 87 The court went on to surreptitiously acknowledge that
Hashimoto may have been fired for a reason or reasons other than making

282. PetitioPrincipii, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that the logical
fallacy petitio principiiis sometimes known as begging the question. This logical fallacy attempts to
support a claim with a premise that itself presupposes the claim).
283. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 626 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
286. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
287. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
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an unsolicited internal complaints regarding ERISA. 288 If Hashimoto was
fired for a reason or reasons other than making an unsolicited internal
complaints regarding ERISA, then she is not a whistleblower.
Henceforth, she would not be afforded protection under Section 510.
The court stated a bare conclusion and held that Hashimoto was
entitled to bring an action under Section 510 because Section 502 allowed
her standing as an ERISA fiduciary. 289 This is erroneous as there is no
standing requirement under Section 510. Moreover, Section 510290 and
Section 502291 are two different sections, and a cause of action may be
asserted under either Section.
Withal, Hashimoto never asserted that the Bank of Hawaii EDS
benefits due to her. Accordingly, Hashimoto does not have a cause of
action under Section 502.292 The court's conclusion promotes a broad
interpretation of the statute, but its explanation suggests a narrow
interpretation. The court hedged its decision by avoiding the question as
to whether Section 510 permits an employer to discharge an employee for
making unsolicited internal complaints regarding violations of the statute.
II. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT ERISA SECTION 502 PROVIDES
STANDING FOR AN ERISA SECTION 510 CLAIM

There is a misconception that ERISA Section 502 provides standing
for an ERISA Section 510 claim. 293 This is based upon the false premise
that "Section 510 does not contain an enforcement or remedial provision,
so courts generally look to ERISA Section 502[] to determine
standing." 2 94 Courts should interpret Section 510, and Section 502 for
that matter, according to the plain meaning rule.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that state law causes of action that came within the scope
288. Id. ("It may be fairly construed to protect a person in Hashimoto's position if in fact, she
was fired because she was protesting a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan.")

(emphasis added).
289. Id. ("Hashimoto is still entitled to bring the action because as a fiduciary she is empowered
to bring a civil action under § 1132 [Section 510] to enforce § 1140 [Section 502], ERISA's whistle
blower provision."); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2018).
290. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
291. See id. § 1132 (2018).
292. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2018).
293. William E. Altman & Danielle C. Lester, Demystifying the Complexities of ERISA Claims
Litigation, 92 MICH. B. J., 29, 31 (Jan. 2013) ("ERISA Section 510 does not contain an enforcement
or remedial provision. Accordingly, courts generally look to ERISA Section 502(a)(3) to determine

standing.") (emphasis added).
294. Id.
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of Section 502 are removable to federal court.295 In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that Section 502 is not to be
supplemented by state law remedies. 296 Courts have then misinterpreted
this by holding that Section 502 enforces Section 510.297 To ingeminate,
Section 502 is a separate claim from Section 510. Whether Section 502
claims are not to be supplemented by state law remedies is of no affect
upon Section 510 claims.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has defmitively held that Section
502 "does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan
injuries." 298 To bring forth a claim under Section 502, a plaintiff must
show that they suffered an injury in their individual account as a result of
a fiduciary breach. 299 No court that claims Section 502 allows a plaintiff
to bring forth a claim under Section 502 discussed how said plaintiff
suffered an injury in their individual account as a result of a fiduciary
breach.30 0
Judge Pooler's concurring opinion in Nicolaou relies on flawed
reasoning from the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota in holding that Section 502 provides standing for an ERISA
Section 510 claim:
ERISA affords plaintiff the right to sue to enjoin any act or practice

which violates ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) [Section 502]. Plaintiff
clearly would have recourse under § 510 had she been discharged in
retaliation for commencing a legal action against defendant to correct
what she perceived to be violations of ERISA. In view of the express

295. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58-67 (1987).
296. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (citing Metro. Life Ins. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746 (1987)); but see Luke Kalamas, Piecing Together the Puzzle:
Analyzing the Collision ofthe ACA and ERISA, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 241,273 (2016) (noting
the perils of ERISA preempting state causes of action. "However ERISA's preemption is often a
double-edged sword; it will preempt state causes of action without providing adequate remedies under
the act itself, as was discussed under the section regarding section 502(a)(1)(B) remedies.").

297. See Zipf v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 799 F.2d 889, 892 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Sandberg v. KPMG
Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 111 F.3d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Section 510 may be enforced by an action
under section 502(a)(3) to protect employees from actions designed to prevent the vesting of pension

rights."); see also Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 2004)
("Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA provides the plan participant with his exclusive remedies for a §510
violation.").

298.

See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) ("We therefore hold

that although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries,
that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a
participant's individual account.").

299.
300.

See id. at 254.
See, e.g., Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 332 (2nd Cir. 2005).
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authorization which plaintiff possesses under ERISA to sue to remedy
violations of ERISA, the court finds it logical to infer that plaintiff also
possesses the right to inform plan administrators of suspected violations
of ERISA. The opposite conclusion would provide a strong incentive to
plan participants to institute litigation without first attempting to resolve
30 1
the issue informally.

According to the above cited passage by Judge Pooler, if the plaintiff
alleged she was discharged in retaliation for commencing a legal action
against defendant to correct what she perceived to be violations of ERISA,
she could bring an action under Section 510.302 However, Judge Pooler
does not cite how she interpreted the statute to determine that "plaintiff
also possesses the right to inform plan administrators of suspected
violations of ERISA." 30 3 This right is not found in the text of ERISA. 304
Section 502 does not state that there is a standing requirement needed for
causes of action. 305 Section 502(a)(3) provides, in part, a civil action may
be brought "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan."306 If Section 510 already provides the act or practice
which is prohibited, then there is no need for another section to be required
for standing. 307 Moreover, it is qualified by "participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary." 30 8 If a person is terminated because they have testified in a
proceeding relating to ERISA, but they are not a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary, they would have no recourse if Section 502 is needed for
standing to bring a claim under Section 510.309 A person could be
employed at a company and be privy to some aspects of their ERISA plans
(i.e., benefits, retirement) and be subpoenaed to testify. 3 10 Section 502 is
not to be supplemented by state law remedies. 3 11 Thus, a person would

301. Id. at 332 (citing McLean v. Carlson Co., 777 F.Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Minn. 1991)).
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
305. See id.
306. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
307. See id. § 1140.
308. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
309. See id.
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
311. Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) ("The expectations that a federal common
law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire
comparison of ERISA's § 502(a) to § 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies
available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) could be supplemented or
supplanted by varying state laws.").
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have no legal recourse to seek remedy, either in federal court or state
court. 3 12
In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly suggested that a broad
interpretation of Section 510 would undermine the purpose of the
provision, which is to "proscribe interference with rights protected by
ERISA." 3 13 Of note, Edwards was a participant in the company's group
health plan. 3 14 It is not clear as to whether she was a fiduciary. 315
Edwards did not raise a claim that she suffered an injury in her individual
account as a result of a fiduciary breach, let alone that any of her rights
were violated.3 16
Assuming arguendo that Section 510 is a remedial statute, then the
plaintiffs in Nicoloau and Edwards would not have standing to bring forth
their claims because Section 502 "does not provide a remedy for
individualinjuries distinct from plan injuries." 3 17 Additionally, under this
framework, it is not clear that any person could ever bring forth a claim
of retaliation under Section 510 if Section 502 is a requirement for
standing. 3 18 Retaliation for being fired is not part of a "plan" so there
would not be an injury. 3 19 And since Section 510 is a remedial statute, a
claim cannot be brought under the statute by itself.3 20
Courts have misinterpreted part of Section 510 to conclude that
Section 502 is needed for standing. 32 1 Section 510 states, in part, "[t]he
provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the
enforcement of this section." 322 Instead of interpreting this as a standing
requirement, another interpretation is that it should be prohibited to
retaliate against a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary if they have "given
information or [have] testified or [are] about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding" 323 with regard to "[recovering] benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to [enforcing] his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to [clarifying] his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 324
312. See id at 56.
313. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990)).
314. Id. at 218.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 219.
317. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008).
318.

See Altman, supra note 293, at 31.

319.
320.

See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254.
See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222-23.

321.

See Altman, supranote 293, at 31.

322. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
323. Id.
324. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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Section 503 of ERISA 32 5 provides participants and beneficiaries with a
cause of action against plans and plan administrators. 326 Section 503 does
not contain the language of "the provisions of section 1132 . .. "327 and
courts have not looked at Section 502 for standing to bring forth claims. 32 8
Accordingly, courts should cease to look at Section 502 for standing to
bring forth Section 510 claims. 329
III. PUBLIC POLICY

Employment protection is a double-edged sword. While it provides
security to incumbent workers, it does make employers reluctant to hire,
which creates a less flexible labor market as well as potentially lowering
wages. 330 We need to only look at Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, a
period known as "Eurosclerosis," 33 1 in which European economies
experienced economic stagnation due to the protections given to
workers. 332 It would be naive to pontificate that this phenomenon has not,
is not, or will not occur in the U.S. 3 33
As the federal government has increased its mandate on benefits and
worker protections, business formation and job creation has been
negatively affected. 3 34 As employers are compelled to offer more and
more benefits and worker protections, workers are adversely impacted by
receiving lower real wages. 33 5 As employers face the burden of rising
nonwage labor costs, they usually respond with layoffs, and seek hiring
325. Id. § 1133.
326. Id. § 1133(2).
327. Id. §§ 1140, 1133.
328.

See John J. Conway, The Private Resolution of Employee Benefits Disputes, Section 503

and the Meaning of "Evidentiary Minds" in ERISA Cases, 95 MICH. BAR J. 44, 45 (2016) (suggesting
that Section 503 and the guidelines in Wilkins create a framework for private resolution, that if
unresolved makes cases "ripe for judicial review").

329.

See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1132(a)(1)(B) (2018) (since Section 510 already prohibits

acts, there is no need to require standing under Section 502).
330. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Centrists, Progressives, and Europhobia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/europe-economy.html.pdf.

331.

See id.

332. See Edward P. Lazear, Job Security Provisions and Employment, 105 Q.J. OF ECON. 699,
700 (1990); see also Olivier Blanchard & Justin Wolfers, The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the
Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence, 110 THE ECON. J. Cl, Cl-C2 (2000).
333. See Krugman, supra note 330 (comparing European economic policies to "[m]edicare for
all" and other progressive ideas advocated in American politics).

334. See Olivia S. Mitchell, The Effects of Mandating Benefits Packages 21 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 3260, 1990).
335. See Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided
Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,

Working Paper No. 3557, 1990).
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workers in a part-time, temporary, and contract capacities instead of fulltime. 336

The "at will" employment doctrine allows employers to terminate
employees "be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of legal wrong." 337
During the 1970s and 1980s, many states began to carve out three broad
exceptions to the at-will doctrine: the implied-contract; 338 public
policy; 33 9 and good-faith. 340 These exceptions have come at a heavy
price. 34 1
Research shows that wrongful termination laws are
economically equivalent to a ten percent tax to employers. 342
Additionally, the three aforementioned exceptions lead to reductions in
aggregate employment. 34 3 The implied-contract exception suffers a four
to five percent decline in aggregate employment. 344 The public policy
and good-faith exceptions experience a two percent decline in aggregate
employment. 345
Whistleblowers will face adversity, and are perhaps even committing
"career suicide." 34 6 To be blunt, this is because whistleblowers are seen
as disloyal. 34 7 Employers will often see whistleblowers in this harsh light,

336.

Mark Wilson & Rebecca Lukens, How to Close Down the Department of Labor, THE

HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 19, 1995), http://thfmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/1995/pdf/bg1058.pdf (citing
Jack A. Meyer, The Impact ofEmployee Benefit Costs on FutureJob Growth, MFG. ALL. POL'Y REV.,
Mar. 1995).
337. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 507, 519-20 (Tenn. 1884).
338.

See J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.

L. REV. 335, 351 (1974).
339. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding
for the first time, by its own subjective viewpoint, that the right to terminate an at will employee could

&

be limited by statute or by "considerations of public policy"); see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Mich. 1980).
340. See Cleary v. Am. Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), overruled in
part by Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110-11 (Cal. 2000); contra Wilmington Coal Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Barr, 2 Ill. App. 84, 87 (1878) ("IV. Any employee may be discharged at any time
without previous notice, and any employee wishing in good faith to leave the company's service may
do so at any time without giving previous notice.") (internal citations omitted).
341. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR-MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER
LIABILITY 62 (1992), Inst. of Civ. Just.

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See id. at 63.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 51.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010) ("Recognizing that whistleblowers often face the

difficult choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing 'career suicide."') (internal
citations omitted).
347. Jukka Varelius, Is Whistle-blowing Compatible with Employee Loyalty?, 85 J. OF BUS.
ETHICS 263, 266, 272 (2009) ("whether or not they are ultimately good for the employer or morally
acceptable, Mary's whistle-blowing can be criticized for expressing disloyalty to her employer.").
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34 8
even if they do agree that the whistleblowers acted morally.
Consequently, whistleblowers will often not find meaningful
employment. 34 9 In a famous example, Jeffrey Wigand blew the whistle
3 50
on his employer, Brown & Williamson, and the tobacco industry.
Seeing the writing on the wall, Wigand knew that blowing the whistle
would put him at risk of losing his job, where he was making $300,000 a
year, and put him in a precarious position of finding difficulties in
providing for his family. 35 1 Wigand's whistleblowing led to him getting
a divorce, taking a ninety percent pay cut to making "$30,000 teaching at
a high school when he was 'cast as a turncoat for spilling company
secrets."' 352 In an obscure example, Abar Rouse was an assistant
basketball coach at Baylor University who secretly taped the head coach
who wanted to put a false narrative regarding a player who was tragically
killed by a teammate. 353 Rouse is in financial distress and has since had
35 4
"If one
an offer to be an assistant coach at a school for $8,000 per year.
me not
with
conversations
my
of my assistants would tape every one of
knowing it, there's no way he would be on my staff," said Mike
355
Krzyzewski, Duke University head basketball Coach.
Without question, whistleblowers who endure hardship for trying to
356
Nevertheless, there is a
cure an unjust situation deserve compassion.
clear distinction between compassion and whether a person is legally
entitled to relief. 357 With regard to the matter at hand, courts that have
interpretated Section 510 broadly have done so due to their personal
beliefs that it is in the interest of "public policy" without fully examining
public policy. 358 As an aside, this is one of the great perils when courts

348.

Id at 265-66.

349.

See, e.g., Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 170,

180.
350. Id. at 171-72.
351. 142 CONG. REC. S17, 1155-56 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1996) (statement of Dr. Wigand).
352. Rick Lyman, A Tobacco Whistle-Blower's Life is Transformed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/a-tobaccowhistle-blower-s-life-is-transformed.html.

353. Dana O'Neil, Rouse in Oblivion Five Years After Baylor Scandal, ESPN (May 7, 2008),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/columns/story?columnist=oneil_dana&id=3371852
(last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See id. (describing Rouse's struggle to explain his situation while applying for jobs and also
expressing that Rouse is a more desirable hire because of his actions).
357. See generally S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110-12 (2010) (discussing legal requirements,
definitions, and rewards for whistleblowers and the entitlement of whistleblower protection).
358. See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d. 332 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Varelius, supra
note 347 (discussing the moral concerns of whistleblowing and employer loyalty).
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interpret laws beyond their plain meaning. 359 Black's Law Dictionary
defines public policy as broadly "principles and standards regarded by the
legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state
and the whole of society."360 We have seen that the more that employers
are compelled to offer more and more benefits and worker protections,
employees as a whole experience deleterious effects such as: lower
aggregate employment opportunities; less full-time positions and more
part-time, temporary, and contract capacities; and lower wages. 36 1 If a
court were to truly explore public policy regarding whistleblower
retaliation laws, it would consider the aforementioned as it is a "concern
to the state and the whole of society. "362 Unfortunately, most courts citing
public policy in this context do not take the concern to the state and the
whole of society, but rather focus specifically on legislating from the
bench because they are sympathetic with a party. 363 When this occurs,
employees in the whole of society are harmed.364
IV. INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR STATUTES

A.

Courts Which Narrowly Interpret Section 510 ofERISA

The Sixth Circuit compared and contrasted Section 510 with other
anti-retaliation provisions, commenting "they tend to include two distinct
types of prohibitions." 36 5 The first "protects employees who oppose,
report or complain about unlawful practices." 366 "The second protects
employees who participate, testify or give information in inquiries,
investigations, proceedings or hearings." 367 "Most anti-retaliation laws

359.

See generally Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2010)

(expanding the meaning of "file any complaint" under the Fair Labor Standards Act to include oral
and written complaints).

360.
361.

Public Policy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Gruber & Krueger, supra note 335, cf Drew Gonshorowski & Rachel Greszler, The

Impact ofAdditional Unemployment Insurance Benefits on Employment andEconomic Recover: How
the $600-per-Week Bonus Could Backfire, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/the-impact-additional-unemployment-insurance-benefitsemployment-and-economic (outlining negative, unanticipated consequences of increasing employee
benefits, specifically unemployment insurance).
362. Public Policy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2014).
See Gonshorowshi & Greszler, supranote 361.
See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 335.
Id.
Id.
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include both types of clauses." 3 68 "By contrast, a few laws include only
the first type of clause, the sort that protects employees who report
unlawful practices." 3 69 The court avers that Section 510 does not contain
the first type of prohibition. 370
The Sixth Circuit even acknowledged that the FLSA anti-retaliation
statute contains the phrase "filed any complaint," which places it with
371
prohibitions in both the aforementioned first and second protections.
The court broadens its interpretation of this statute by also including the
3 72
The court
phrase "any complaint" instead of just focusing on "filed."
reasons that this phrase leaves the statute open to limitless scenarios,
whereas the phrase "testified or is about to testify" in Section 510
significantly narrows the scope. 3 73
B.

Courts Which Broadly Interpret Section 510 of ERISA

Arguments in favor of a broad interpretation almost always analogize
the FLSA anti-retaliation statute to Section 510.374 The basis of Judge

368. Id. at 335-36 ("See, e.g., National Transit Systems Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 1142(a);
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26; Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) § 2087(a); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 218c(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b); Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a);
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 31105(a); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60129(a). Many of these laws were in
existence before 1974, when Congress enacted ERISA. See the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title VII.").

369. Id. at 336 (See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act); 46
U.S.C. § 80507(a) (International Safe Container Act)). A few laws include only the second type of
clause, which is the sort that protects employees who participate in inquiries, proceedings or
hearings. See, e.g., Longshore and Harbor workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 948a; see e.g.,

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a).
370. Sexton, 754 F.3d at 336 ("In enacting this provision of ERISA, Congress included only a
clause protecting people who give information or testify in inquiries or proceedings. Unlike most of
the other laws just cited, ERISA thus does not contain a clause protecting people who oppose, report

or complain about unlawful practices.").
371. Id. at 335.
372. Id. at 339-40.
373. Cf id. at 339 (explaining that broadening the anti-retaliation rule will result in more
litigation).

374. Compare George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 812 (7th Cir.
2012) (interpreting "inquiry or proceeding" in the anti-retaliation provision under ERISA), with
Sexton, F.3d at 333-34 (limiting their interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision under the FSLA
to not include an employee's one-time unsolicited complaint to his employer about alleged violations
under ERISA) (internal citations omitted).
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Helene White's dissenting opinion in Sexton is that after Kasten, all
whistleblower statutes should be resolved in favor of employees. 37 5 Judge
White attempts to obfuscate this reasoning by alleging that Section 510 is
ambiguous. 37 6 Judge White's perspective is that the ambiguity lies with
the parsing of the statute proffered by the Seventh Circuit. 377 As noted
supra, the Seventh Circuit's parsing is perplexing and does not adequately
argue why Section 510 should be interpreted broadly. 378
The Kasten decision is frighteningly disturbing. 3 79 The U.S.
Supreme Court did not use statutory interpretation as the basis for its
reasoning, but rather relied on its own intuition that plaintiff was telling
the truth and defendant was not, without any corroborating evidence. 380
This activity, Kasten concludes, led the company to discipline him and,
in December 2006, to dismiss him. Saint-Gobain presents a different
version of events. It denies that Kasten made any significant complaint
about the timeclock location. And it Says that it dismissed Kasten simply
because Kasten, after being repeatedly warned, failed to record his
comings and goings on the timeclock. Forpresentpurposes we accept
Kasten's version of these contested events as valid. 81

This is the underlying purpose as to why Kasten was decided. 382
In Kasten, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly interpreted the word
"filed" to include both written and oral complaints, but seemed skeptical
of it at oral argument. 383 Justice Sotomayor posited,

375. Sexton, F.3d at 342-52 (the two most recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate a trend
of the Court interpreting anti-retaliation provisions to afford broad protection of employees) (citing

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) and Crawford v. Metro. Govn't
of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271 (2009)).
376. Id. at 347, 352 ("George followed Kasten in deciding that '[w]hen dealing with ambiguous
anti-retaliation provisions,' a court must 'resolve the ambiguity in favor of protecting employees.' 694

F.3d at 814 (citing Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1333-35) ... I would follow George, the only circuit court
decision issued after Kasten. 694 F.3d at 814 ('When dealing with ambiguous anti-retaliation
provisions, we are supposed to resolve the ambiguity in favor of protecting employees.' (citing
Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1333-35)).").
377. Id. at 342-43.
378. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 17 (2011) ("Seventh
Circuit erred in determining that oral complaints cannot fall within the scope of the phrase 'filed any
complaint' in the Act's antiretaliation provision.").
379. Eric Schnapper, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions From the United States

Supreme
380.
381.
382.
383.

Court's 2010-2011 Term, 27 A.B.A J. LAB. & EMP. L. 329, 352-53 (2012).
See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 7-16.
See id. at 6.
See Schnapper, supra note 379.
See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 9-10; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Kasten v. Saint-

Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (No. 09-834).
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So you mean that if the Government says you've got to file a complaint
with us by either calling us or submitting something in writing, and at a
cocktail party a worker goes up to a Government employee in that
agency, and says, you know, my company is violating the law. That
that's enough? 384

Justice Sotomayor goes on to say "Well, at a cocktail party that employee
may be there on personal time, but when he goes back to work the next
morning he could do something. Is that enough?" 385 In this line of
questioning, Justice Sotomayor notes that this decision will ultimately
come back before the U.S. Supreme Court in some capacity, perhaps
under another statute, and likely to end up with a different result.38 6
So what you are doing is he is estopping the Government from saying,
the only way that you can file a complaint with us is to do it in writing.
We are now forcing the Government to adopt an oral procedure even if
it chose not to? Even if it thought an oral procedure would create havoc,
3 87
et cetera, et cetera?

Justice Sotomayor alludes to the fact that an employee who makes an oral
complaint can just as easily make a written complaint, and this would
eliminate the "he said, she said" part of the situation, as it pertains to the
matter before the Court. 388 A broad interpretation of Section 510 will
undoubtedly lead to "he said, she said" claims. 389 "[F]requently 'he said,
she said' trials in which the jury must reach a unanimous verdict based
solely upon two diametrically different versions of an event, unaided by
any physical, scientific, or other corroborative evidence." 390 Justice
Sotomayor, who ruled in favor of a broad interpretation of the FLSA antiretaliation statute, foreshadowed the danger of the ruling. 391

384. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 383, at 4-5.
385. Id. at 5.
386. Cf id.
387. Id. at 6.
388. Cf Id. at 6, 19 (explaining that when a complaint is oral and too informal, there may not be
enough evidence to support that it was made).
389. Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 383, at 7, 19.

390. Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 561-2.
391. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 3-4, 14.
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V. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM

A. Protectthe Inquiry
A broad interpretation of Section 510 is subject to reductio ad
To exemplify, suppose
absurdum ("reduction to absurdity"). 392
Employee A and Employee B are poor employees. 39 3 "[T]hey were often
absent from work and were reprimanded many times for insubordination
and incompetence." 394 The company which Employee A and Employee
B work for are moving to terminate them. 395 Employee A makes an
unsolicited internal complaint, stating that "there are violations of ERISA,
I plan to bring these violations to the attention of the U.S. Department of
Labor unless they are immediately remedied." Employee B does not
make an unsolicited internal complaint. Shortly thereafter, the company
terminates Employee A and Employee B. Under a broad interpretation of
Section 510, Employee A would be protected from being terminated but
Employee B would not be simply because the latter made a vague
reference about violations of ERISA. 396 In this scenario, Employee A did
not even specify said violations. Nevertheless, Employee A cleverly
exploited a broad interpretation of Section 510 to insulate himself from
termination under this line of reasoning by simply alleging violations of
ERISA. 3 97
In another instance, suppose Employee C is one of several trustees
of the company's ERISA plan. 3 98 The trustees decide to set up a directed
trust, which takes investment authority out of the control of the trustees
and places it in the control of an investment manager. 399 Employee C
392. Reductio Ad Absurdum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ("[I]n logic, disproof
of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.").
393. See generally Tundo v. Cnty. of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2019) (holding New
Jersey's Civil Service Commission did not violate a Constitutional property right after using its
discretion to not rehire employees who were fired for poor performance).
394. Id. at 286.
395. Id.
396.

See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 3-4, 14; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 383, at

4-6, 18 (Employee A stating the existence of a violation may constitute the notice to the employer
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ).
397.

See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 3-4, 14; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 383, at

4-6, 18.
398.

See supra Part V.A. (outlining a hypothetical example); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)

(1994) (section 403 establishes fiduciary duties under ERISA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,

§ 185 (1959) (here comment c, provides that "[a] power given to some third person . .. to control the
trustee in disposing of or acquiring trust investments, would ordinarily be a power for the benefit of
the beneficiaries of the trust.").
399.

See sources cited supra note 398.
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discovers that the directed trust is stealing funds. In order to conceal this,
the directed trust offers Employee C a cut of the ill-gotten gains. After
some time, Employee C senses that the directed trust will be caught.
Subsequently, Employee C alerts the company and the other trustees
about his ill-gotten gains, and has "given information" under a broad
interpretation of Section 510.400 Thus, Employee C would then have
immunity from being terminated. 4 0 1 Employee C would also be unjustly
enriched. 402 In a spin on this scenario, some trustees have agreements
which exonerate them from liability. 4 03 If Employee C would have such
an agreement, he would have immunity from liability, as well as from
termination. 404 In Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado
Beach Hotel Corp.,405 the First Circuit held that mismanagement does not
factor into the computations as to whether there is a funding deficiency. 4 06
"Under the Court's reasoning, employers could face limitless liability for
trustee mismanagement." 4 07
Congress had its reasons in not expanding Section 510.408 Courts
that have utilized a broad interpretation of whistleblower statutes have
done so with a presumption that public policy dictates it.4 09 With regards
to Section 510, courts that broadly interpret the statute have failed to
appreciate that this reading could compromise the "inquiries or

400.
401.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018).
See id.

402.

See generally Unjust Enrichment, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex

/unjust enrichment (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (explaining that "[u]njust enrichment occurs when
Party A confers a benefit upon Party B without Party A receiving the proper restitution required by

law.").
403. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 351 F. Supp. 775, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see Rippey v.
Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 736-37 (D. Colo. 1967); see Newhouse v. Canal
Nat'l Bank of Portland, 124 F. Supp. 239, 249 (S.D. Me. 1954).
404. See Morrissey, 351 F. Supp. at 782; see Rippey, 273 F. Supp. at 736-37; see Newhouse, 124
F. Supp. at 249.
405. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 54
(1st Cir. 2010).
406. Id.
407.

Max Birmingham, The PaperChase:Should the Principlesof ContractLaw Govern ERISA

Section 302?, 37 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 293, 325 (2020).
408. See generally Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d. 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2014)
(analyzing the statutory language of 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140 [Section 510] in order to understand
Congress's intent and what actions are to be protected).

409. See generally Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2015), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) ("Because this Court believes that the language of the DFA
whistleblower-protection provision is at least somewhat in conflict, it is relevant to observe that the
Fifth Circuit's resolution of that conflict - reading subsection (iii) narrowly to require a report to
the Commission - seems at odds with public policy underlying the DFA.") (emphasis added).
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proceedings." 4 10 "Keep in mind, moreover, that Congress may have
enacted this provision not so much to protect the jobs of whistleblowers
as to protect the integrity of inquiries. Section 1140's reference to
'inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]' suggests that Congress had the latter
objective in mind."4 11
B. Argumentum Ad Lapidem
The Sixth Circuit makes an argumentum ad lapidem ("appeal to the
stone")4 12 by dismissing the argument for a broad interpretation of Section
510 as absurd without demonstrating proof for its absurdity.4 13 The Sixth
Circuit remarked that extending the protection of Section 510 to
unsolicited internal complaints:
As shown, Congress opted to protect employees in many ways in the
context of investigations and unprompted complaints, some that may
appear underinclusive and some that may appear overinclusive. When
Congress picks one approach or the other in a given statute, that does
not give a court license to rewrite the law-here by crossing "in any
inquiry or proceeding" out of § 1140 [Section 510]. Denying this point
means condemning as absurd dozens of federal anti-retaliation clauses
4 14
that limit their attention to inquiries, proceedings or investigations.

The court did not fully explain how a broad interpretation of Section 510
would lead to absurd results. 4 15 The court is stating that a broad
interpretation of Section 510 necessitates eliminating "inquiry or
proceeding" from interpreting the statute, as well as including language in
4 16
the statute which is not present, and argues that this is absurd.
Notwithstanding, the court does not hold that this would lead to absurd
results under Section 510.417 Instead, the court concludes that a broad
interpretation of Section 510 would lead to absurd results for other federal
410.

See supraPart I.B.

411.

Sexton, 754 F.3d. at 338.

See Argumentum ad lapidem - Appeal to the stone, COGNITIVE-LIBERTY.ONLINE, https://
cognitive-liberty.online/argumentum-ad-lapidem-appeal-to-the-stone/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2021)
412.

(translating argumentum ad lapidem from Latin to English as "appeal to the stone." This phrase refers
to the "logical fallacy that consists in dismissing a statement as absurd without giving proof of its

absurdity.").
413. Sexton, 754 F.3d at 337.
414. Id.
415. See id.
416. Id. at 336 ("Subtracting words from the law is bad enough, but Sexton's theory also requires
us to add words in their place.").

417.

Id. at 337.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

41

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 5
354

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 38:2

anti-retaliation clauses. 4 18 The court even acknowledges that it should
focus on Section 510 rather than other anti-retaliation statutes when it
professes "[f]or what it is worth, our decision has few if any consequences
beyond this Act." 4 19
The court needed to expand on its claim by encapsulating that a broad
interpretation of Section 510 would lead to absurd results because
eliminating "inquiry or proceeding" from the statute would leave open the
possibility of employees "giving information" in limitless scenarios. 4 20 A
person can say they have 'given information' by telling, inter alia, a
coworker, friends, or family. 4 21 By eliminating "inquiry or proceeding"
from the statute there are no boundaries as to where and to whom the
information is given. 4 22 Thus, if an employee "gives information"
without limit, it cannot be reasonably asserted that the employer retaliated
against said employee if the employer did not know about the given
information. 42 3
CONCLUSION

The "inquiry or proceeding" language in Section 510 evidences that
Congress intended to protect the integrity of the aforementioned, rather
than protect whistleblowers. 424 The courts that broadly interpret the
statute attempt to evade this by projecting their own views as to what
public policy dictates for anti-retaliation provisions. 42 5 Courts that
narrowly interpret Section 510 and hold that "giving information" gives
unfettered discretion, furtively hide their judicial activism by alleging that
the statute is ambiguous. 42 6 However, "[t]hey do not prove it."4 27 The
courts that narrowly interpret Section 510 generally point to Kasten, and
even there the U.S. Supreme Court is reticent about their decision. 42 8 At

418. Id.
419. Id. at 342.
420. See id. at 335
421. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 302, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (2018).
422. See id.
423. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 383, at 18 (Justice Ginsburg questions whether
an employer will have notice of a complaint if an employee tells a coworker - instead of their
employer - that a violation exists).

424. Id. at 18.
425. See supra Section I.B.
426. Cf Sexton, 754 F.3d at 341 ("No less importantly, disagreements between judges at most
suggest ambiguity.").
427. Id.
428. See supra Section I.A.
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oral argument, Justice Alito even asked counsel "Are you filing your
comments right now?" 4 29 Counsel responded, "I think I am, Your
Honor."4 30 Justice Alito retorted "You are? Really?" 43 1 Perhaps the U.S.
Supreme Court was sympathetic with the plaintiff, and a reason why they
accepted his position of the contested events.4 32 The phrase "filed" was
interpreted broadly by the subsequent "any" 433 which in turn broadens
"complaint."4 34 There is no such broad language in Section 510.435

429. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 383, at 6.
430. Id. at 6.
431. Id.
432. Cf id.
433. Cf id at 12 ("Mr. Kaster: Your Honor, I'mjust looking at the statutory language-file "any
complaint." It's important-the word "any" has a particular meaning. I would not that if - -").
434. Cf id. at 27 ("Justice Sotomayor: This is the - - this was the Lochner era where they weren't
even sure they could do this. But why should we read their language with a narrow reading of any

complaint?") (emphasis added).
435. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2014). ("[W]here words differ
as they differ here, Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d
345 (2006)).
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